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Introduction 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently provided its verdict about the 
question whether taste could be susceptible to copyright protection. Copyright in the European Union 
(EU) is not fully harmonised though there are a set of EU Directives which harmonise certain aspects 
of copyright law. The most far reaching Directive with regard to copyright law is Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (so-called InfoSoc Directive). 
Within its Articles 2, 3 & 4, the Directive stipulates that the exclusive rights of reproduction, 
communication to the public and distribution enjoyed by authors relate to their works. Unlike the UK 
which has a so-called closed list system of copyright protected works, the InfoSoc Directive leaves 
this question open as to what constitutes a work. This then leads to the question whether untraditional 
creations – in the copyright sense – could fall within the canon of copyright protected works. The 
protectability of taste or smell through copyright then inevitably comes to mind. And copyright law 
seems to be an attractive solution for IP protection since trade mark protection still remains practically 
impossible for such unconventional marks. 
Background 
“Heksenkaas’” is a spreadable dip with cream cheese and fresh herbs produced by the Dutch cheese 
manufacturer Levola Hengelo BV ("Levola"). Smilde Foods BV ("Smilde") produced and sold a 
cheese spread called “Witte Wieven” since 2014. Levola considered its competitors product to taste 
like “Heksenkaas” and subsequently filed a suit for copyright infringement before the Rechtbank 
Gelderland (Gelderland District Court). Levola argued that the taste of “Heksenkaas’” was its 
manufacturer’s own intellectual creation and would constitute a ‘work’ in the meaning of Article 1 of 
the Dutch Copyright Act. The company “defined copyright in a taste as being ‘the overall impression 
on the sense of taste caused by the consumption of a food product, including the sensation in the 
mouth perceived through the sense of touch.’”1 In addition, Levola asked the court to rule that the 
taste of Smilde’s product was a reproduction of the taste of “Heksenkaas”.  
The District Court rejected this claim which made Levola appeal this decision. The Gerechtshof 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden (Regional Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden) noted the diametrically 
opinions of the parties in relation to the protectability of taste through copyright. On the one hand, the 
appellant Levola argued that taste could constitute “a literary, scientific or artistic work that is eligible 
for copyright protection”2 through an analogy to scent and relied, inter alia, on a judgment of the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) from 2006. In this decision the court held that the 
scent of a perfume may, in principle, be susceptible for copyright protection.3  Smilde, on the other 
hand, submitted that taste would fall outside the usual categories of copyright protected works which 
would relate to visual and aural creations.  In addition, “the instability of a food product and the 
subjective nature of the taste experience preclude the taste of a food product qualifying for copyright 
protection as a work.”4 Furthermore, Smilde submitted that the exclusive rights of copyright and its 
exceptions are practically inapplicable in the case of taste. To support its submission, Smilde that the 
Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) has held that rejected the possibility of scent being 
protected by copyright.5 The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal noted the divergence in the 
jurisprudence with regard to the protectability of scent as a copyright protected work in national 
supreme courts within the EU and decided to stay the proceedings. Since the definition of protectable 
subject matter of copyright law was now up to the CJEU due to the InfoSoc Directive it submitted the 
following questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling: 
1(a) Does EU law preclude the taste of a food product — as the author’s own intellectual creation — 
being granted copyright protection? In particular: 
(b)  Is copyright protection precluded by the fact that the expression “literary and artistic 
works” in Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention, which is binding on all the Member States of 
the European Union, includes “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, 
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression”, but that the examples cited in that 
provision relate only to creations which can be perceived by sight and/or by hearing? 
(c) Does the (possible) instability of a food product and/or the subjective nature of the taste 
experience preclude the taste of a food product being eligible for copyright protection? 
(d) Does the system of exclusive rights and limitations, as governed by Articles 2 to 5 of 
Directive [2001/29], preclude the copyright protection of the taste of a food product? 
(2)      If the answer to question 1(a) is in the negative: 
(a)      What are the requirements for the copyright protection of the taste of a food product? 
(b)      Is the copyright protection of a taste based solely on the taste as such or (also) on the 
recipe of the food product? 
(c)      What evidence should a party who, in infringement proceedings, claims to have created 
a copyright-protected taste of a food product, put forward? Is it sufficient for that party to 
present the food product involved in the proceedings to the court so that the court, by tasting 
and smelling, can form its own opinion as to whether the taste of the food product meets the 
requirements for copyright protection? Or should the applicant (also) provide a description of 
the creative choices involved in the taste composition and/or the recipe on the basis of which 
the taste can be considered to be the author’s own intellectual creation? 
(d)      How should the court in infringement proceedings determine whether the taste of the 
defendant’s food product corresponds to such an extent with the taste of the applicant’s food 
product that it constitutes an infringement of copyright? Is a determining factor here that the 
overall impressions of the two tastes are the same?’6 
 
Opinion by the Advocate General  
In his opinion from 25 July 2018, Advocate General (AG) Whatelet submitted that the concept of a 
‘work’ was not defined within the InfoSoc Directive. Hence, the need for a uniform application of EU 
law would require an autonomous definition of a ‘work’ which would preclude Member States from 
providing different or additional standards.7 The AG then provided an interesting point on the 
relationship between the concept of a ‘work’ and the requirement for an intellectual creation – the 
standard for originality in the EU. The question was whether a work may be protected by copyright 
within the InfoSoc where only the criterion of originality (i.e. the author’s own intellectual creation) is 
met.  The AG, however, held that both these concepts would need to be satisfied.8   
By referring to Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention which states that literary and artistic works that 
are eligible for copyright protection, the AG deduced that this would only relate to “works which are 
perceived visually or aurally.”9 The AG added that where doubts remained as to whether certain 
creations could be protected by copyright, the Berne Convention was amended or new multilateral 
agreements adopted.10 Additionally, the AG referred to the idea/expression dichotomy whereby only 
expressions of ideas were protected not the idea as such and likened a recipe to being an unprotected 
idea. Finally, the AG elaborated on more practical matters by stating that original expressions 
protected by copyright would have to be identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity.11 Here, 
the AG links the discussion to that held within EU trade mark law. In the Siekmann decision, the 
CJEU12 held that a non-traditional mark (there a scent) would have to be ” clear, precise, self-
contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective” in order to fulfil the criterion of 
graphical representation.13  The AG stated that with “today’s technology, the precise and objective 
identification of a taste or scent is currently impossible.”14 Hence, the AG found that taste of a food 
product is precluded from copyright protection. 
The decision 
After discussing the admissibility of the proceedings, the Court engaged with the first question by the 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court and distilled it into whether “(i) the taste of a food product from being 
protected by copyright under that directive and (ii) national legislation from being interpreted in such 
a way that it grants copyright protection to such a taste.”15 In order to respond to the question, the 
court found that while Articles 2-5 of the InfoSoc Directive refer to the works of authors that 
encompass the exclusive rights or may be subject to exceptions or limitations, there is no reference to 
national law of what constitutes a work. In such case, an autonomous and uniform definition would 
need to be applied.16 
The Court then held that two cumulative conditions must be met for there to be a work in the meaning 
of the Infosoc Directive: First, the subject matter in question must be the author’s own intellectual 
creation and secondly that this expression may be classified as a work. The Court reiterated the 
findings of the AG with regard to the EU’s obligation to adhere to the provisions of the Berne 
Convention albeit not being a party to it. Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention would protect literary 
and artistic works which would include “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic 
domain, whatever the mode or form of its expression may be.” In addition, the idea-expression 
dichotomy enshrined within Article 2 WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 9(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement would be part of the EU legal order.17  
Based on these reiterations, the court held that a work in the meaning of the InfoSoc Directive “must 
be expressed in a manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity, even 
though that expression is not necessarily in permanent form.”18 It explained that authorities must be 
able to clearly and precisely identify the subject matter of the exclusive rights in order to protect it. 
Such considerations would also apply to third parties, such as competitors. Additionally, the Court 
emphasised the necessity of legal certainty which would prohibit any form of subjectivity which 
would mandate that “the protected subject matter […] must be capable of being expressed in a precise 
and objective manner.”19 
In relating this to the question at hand, the Court held that the taste of food could not be established 
with precision and objectivity. Food, would, unlike literary, pictorial, cinematographic or musical 
works, be based essentially on taste sensations and experiences which would be subjective and 
variable. Much would depend “on factors particular to the person tasting the product concerned, such 
as age, food preferences and consumption habits, as well as on the environment or context in which 
the product is consumed.”20 The Court added that a precise and objective identification of the subject 
matter in order to distinguish it from other products would not be possible with current state of 
scientific development.21 Consequently, the Court held that the taste of food could not be regarded as 
a work within the meaning of the InfoSoc Directive.22 The uniform definition of the concept of work 
which the Court established also precludes EU Member States from granting copyright protection for 
the taste of food.23   
Comment 
The CJEU’s decision was eagerly awaited and its decision not all too surprising. The case further 
develops the autonomous concept of what may constitute the subject matter protectable by copyright. 
The way in which the Court excluded taste as copyright protectable subject matter may lead to some 
doctrinal “hiccups”. Even if the Court did not apply the rationale derived from the Siekmann criteria 
with regard to trade mark law expressis verbis, it appears that the Court was inspired by them. This 
can be seen where the Court requires that the subject matter must be clear, precise and objective. The 
question then arises whether traditional works, such as musical works, are always perceived 
objectively or are rather subject to the age, experience of the listener as well as to other circumstances. 
Another issue that the decision creates is for the closed list systems of the UK and Ireland. The 
CJEU’s decision could mean that such system would not be tenable anymore24 even though the Court 
denied protection for taste in this particular case. But the general definition which the Court provided 
applies now in all EU Member States. To a certain degree it appears that the Court was led by the goal 
of excluding taste from the canon of copyright protected works for practical reasons – a valid goal, 
especially when one tries to imagine how close tastes must be to be an infringement of copyright. But 
the means to reach this goal could have been placed on doctrinally more sound arguments. 
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